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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 18-3044
___________
EDWARD THOMAS KENNEDY,
Appellant
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA;
THOMAS WASSERMAN WOLF, in his official capacity and individual capacities
_____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-18-cv-03374)
District Judge: Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II
_____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 21, 2018
Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 24, 2018)
___________
OPINION*
___________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Edward Kennedy appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of
his complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). For
the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
In August 2018, Kennedy sought leave in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) with a complaint
wherein he named the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Governor Thomas
Westerman Wolf as defendants.1 Kennedy asked for damages as well as declaratory and
injunctive relief as a result of defendants’ alleged actions in connection with his arrests in
June and August 2017, and his incarceration from August 28 through August 30, 2017.
Kennedy claimed that his complaint presented a federal question, as well as causes of
action for “trespass,” “trespass on the case,” “trespass on the case – vicarious liability,”
and “failure to provide a republican form of government.”
After concluding that Kennedy was indigent for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the
District Court screened the complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B) and ultimately dismissed it
for failure to state a viable claim. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a dismissal pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is de novo. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d
Cir. 2000). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

1

Kennedy erroneously refers to the Governor as Thomas Wasserman Wolf, rather than
Thomas Westerman Wolf.
2

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)).
For essentially the reasons set forth in its Memorandum Opinion, we agree with
the District Court’s dismissal of Kennedy’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from
claims under § 1983, and is not considered to be a “person” subject to liability for
purposes of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989).
With respect to Governor Wolf, the District Court properly concluded that vicarious
liability is inapplicable to § 1983 actions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (citing Monell v.
New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Given that the
complaint is devoid of any plausible suggestions that Governor Wolf either maintained a
policy or custom which caused Kennedy the alleged harm or that Governor Wolf had any
personal involvement in the referenced events, the District Court was correct to conclude
that he failed to state a viable claim. See Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307,
316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015).
We further agree that Kennedy’s claims regarding the incidents of June and August 2017
are duplicative of those asserted in Kennedy v. Hanna, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 18-cv-00977.
The District Court’s dismissal, without prejudice, of the claims involving the incidents of
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June and August 2017 specifically allows Kennedy to proceed with those claims in E.D.
Pa. Civ. No. 18-cv-00977, which is pending before the same District Court judge.2
Kennedy appears to be arguing in his Informal Brief that the District Court
exceeded its “jurisdiction or authority” by dismissing his complaint under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Informal Br. at 1-2, 6. However, the District Court had
jurisdiction over Kennedy’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Given
the conclusions of the District Court’s screening, dismissal of the complaint was proper
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The remaining conclusory allegations in Kennedy’s brief are
baseless and do not warrant further discussion.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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The District Court did not err in denying leave to amend. See Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
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